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What Did Congress Really Want?: An Implied
Private Right of Action Under Section 17(a) of the
1933 Securities Act
INTRODUCTION

Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act' makes fraud unlawful in connection
with the offer or sale of certain securities. It is a criminal statute and does
not expressly provide a private remedy for those who suffer a loss resulting
from a securities fraud.2 Thus, for an implicit private right of action to exist
under section 17(a), the courts must create one.' The question whether the
courts should imply such a remedy under section 17(a) has become more
significant in recent years because of developments in related antifraud pro4
visions of the federal securities laws.
Courts and commentators have grappled for some time with the question
of whether a private right of action exists under section 17(a).1 The inability
to conclude this issue, however, is not the result of lack of attention from

1. Section 17(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or

(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
2. Congress did provide, however, for more limited private remedies under sections 11 and
12 of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, 771, respectively. See infra notes 125, 131.
3. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court stated:
When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their
statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much when it creates
those rights. But the Court has long recognized that under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is not inconsistent with an intent on its
part to have such a remedy available to the persons benefited by its legislation.
441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). See also infra text accompanying notes 21-44.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 14-19.
5. At least one court addressed the issue of a private right of action under section 17(a) as
early as 1949. See Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Numerous lower courts
have since addressed the question. See infra notes 45-67. The first comment regarding the issue
appeared as early as 1933. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J.
171, 181-82 (1933).
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scholars 6 or from the courts.' The circuits have disagreed on the issue for
some time and the analyses they employ vary considerably. 8 The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to review the issue. 9 Until the Supreme

Court rules, however, a more unified approach is needed in the lower courts
to ensure a more consistent answer to the interpretation of this federal statute. 0
This Note analyzes the relevant precedents in this area of the law and the

legislative history of section 17(a) in an effort to suggest how the Supreme
Court might best decide the issue. Section I of this Note reviews and discusses
Supreme Court precedent in the area of implied private rights under federal
statutes generally. It also reviews the positions that the lower courts have

taken with respect to the section 17(a) private right of action issue. Section
II examines the legislative history of the 1933 Securities Act (1933 Act) and
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of relying on such a record to
resolve the section 17(a) private right question. Section III then points out the
problems the Court will encounter reconciling the implication of a private

right of action with recent precedent in related areas of securities law.

6. Numerous articles have appeared in literature over the years, although subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have rendered moot some of the theories set forth by these authors. See, e.g.,
Aiken, Availability of an Implied Civil Cause of Action Under Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 9 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 207 (1984); Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning
of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REv.
641 (1978); Horton, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act-The Wrong Place for a Private
Right, 68 Nw. U. L. Rev. 44 (1973); Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action and the Federal
SecuritiesLaws: A HistoricalPerspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 783 (1980); Scholl &Perkowski,
An Implied Right of Action Under Section 17(a): The Supreme Court Has Said "No," But Is
Anybody Listening 36 U. Mmim L. REv. 41 (1981); Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEo. L.J. 163 (1979); Note, Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933: Implication of a Private Right of Action, 29 UCLA L. REv. 244 (1981);
Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Securities Act of 1933 Section 17(a), 14 U.
MicH. J.L. REF. 563 (1981).

7. When the Supreme Court decided Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976),
section 17(a) took on a new significance. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
8. Compare, e.g., Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982) (legislative
record dictates conclusion that Congress did not intend there to be a private right of action under
section 17(a)) with Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978) (language of section
17(a) is broad enough to imply a private right of action), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
9. See Bateman Eichler v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 304 n.9 (1985); Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.2 (1983); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551, 557 n.9 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See also
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S.Ct. 3143, 3152 (1986); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689 (1979)
(the Court stated in dicta that any private right of action under section 17(a) must be implied,
but again failed to address the issue).
10. A cause of action under section 17(a) enjoys several advantages over one under section
17(a)'s counterpart, Rule lOb-5. See infra note 12 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs, therefore,
have an incentive to shop for the forum in which they may assert a private right of action under
section 17(a). Given the nationwide sales of most securities, it is not difficult for most plaintiffs
to gain jurisdiction in any of the jurisdictions which recognize the section 17(a) private right of
action.

19881
I.

IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION
JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER
SECTION 17(a)

The question of the existence of a private remedy under section 17(a) first
arose in 1949."1 Rule 10b-5,12 the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act (1934 Act)
counterpart of section 17(a), dominated securities fraud case law until the
mid-1970's.' 3 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.

Hochfelder,'4 plaintiffs generally pleaded section 17(a) claims in tandem with
Rule 1Ob-5 claims, with the Rule lOb-5 claim usually overshadowing the section

17(a) cause of action."S
A.

Life After Hoclifelder

The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Hochfelder made section 17(a) much
more attractive to plaintiffs. Hochfelder required that plaintiffs prove scienter
11. Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
12. Rule 1Ob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
The SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 under the power of section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities
Act. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1983). Section 17(a) is substantially the same as Rule lOb-5.
In fact, the SEC derived the language of rule lOb-5 from section 17(a), changing only the
language with respect to "offerees" to "purchasers" to reflect the different emphasis of the 1934
Act on trading, rather than new issues. Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 6, at 107 n.31.
For a discussion of differences between Rule lob-5 and section 17(a), see generally 5 A. JAcoas,
LrGATIoN AND PRAcncE UNDER RULE 10a-5 § 3.01[d] (1985). In short, the differences are: (1)
Rule lOb-5 applies to any "purchase or sale" while section 17(a) covers the "offer or sale" of
any security, and (2) section 17(a) does not contain the phrase "manipulative or deceptive device"
found in section 10(b).
13. See Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 6, at 42.
14. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Defrauded purchasers sued the accounting firm that audited the
book§ of the brokerage finn that had sold the fraudulent securities, claiming negligence on the
part of the accountants.
15. See Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 6, at 42.
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under Rule lOb-5, thus barring claims based on the more favorable negligence
standard under that Rule. Thus, if a plaintiff wanted to bring an action for
fraud based on negligence, she would have to find an alternative to Rule 10b5.
Section 17(a) took on a new significance after Hochfelder. A plaintiff who
could not prove scienter might be successful under a negligence standard
applied under section 17(a). After Hochfelder, the Court decided Aaron v.
SEC.16 In Aaron, it held that in order to convict for securities fraud the SEC
must prove scienter under section 17(a)(1). However, the SEC need only prove
negligence under subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3). 17 This decision further increased
the possibility that a plaintiff could proceed with a section 17(a) claim under
a negligence standard. Plaintiffs could now-theoretically at least-bring negligence-based fraud claims under section 17(a) which they had formerly brought
under Rule lOb-5. The courts consequently experienced an explosion of section 17(a) claims, 8 and the split among the circuits as to the existence of a
private right of action widened.1 9 The Court has yet to address the issue of
a private right of action under section 17(a). One must therefore look to
related Supreme Court precedent in the area of implied private rights in order
to determine whether the Court will imply such a right under section 17(a).

B.

The Supreme Court and Private Rights of Action Generally

The line of relevant cases begins in 1975. In that year, the Court abandoned
its prior unstructured approach to analysis of private rights under federal
statutes 2° in Cort v. Ash. 2' In Cort, the Court formulated a four-part test to

16. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
17. Aaron was a criminal case in which the Court expressly limited the issue to whether the
SEC in seeking injunctive relief under section 20(b) for violations of section 17(a) is required to
establish scienter. As a result of this limitation, it is questionable whether this case applies to civil
causes of action under section 17(a). See infra text accompanying note 116.
18. A Westlaw search showed that prior to the Hochfelder decision in 1976, lower courts
reported approximately four cases based on section 17(a) claims. Between the time of the decision
and the end of 1986, the lower courts reported over 74 decisions on point, with the vast majority
coming after the Aaron decision in 1979.
19. See infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text.
20. Prior to 1975, if Congress enacted a statute for the benefit of a special class, the judiciary
normally recognized a remedy for members of that class. See, e.g., Texas & Pacific R.R. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). The Court occasionally refused to recognize an implied remedy, either
because the statute in question was a general regulatory prohibition enacted for the benefit of
the public at large, or because there was evidence that Congress intended an express remedy to
provide the exclusive method of enforcement. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464
(1959). Significantly, congressional silence or ambiguity was an insufficient reason for the denial
of a remedy for a member of the class which a statute was enacted to protect. See, e.g., Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
For discussions of the early private right cases, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 376-77 (1982), and Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 733-34 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
21. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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determine whether or not a federal statute affords a private right of action.
The private right cases that the Court has decided since Cort demonstrate the
progression the Court has made in this area toward strict statutory construction
and heavy reliance on legislative history.
1.

Cort v. Ash and Its Progeny

The issue before the Court in Cort was whether a plaintiff-shareholder could
bring a derivative suit against the directors of a corporation for an alleged
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 610, a criminal statute which prohibited corporations
from contributing to presidential political campaigns. The Supreme Court set
forth the following test:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especialbenefit the statute
was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?2
The Court held that section 610 did not imply a private right of action.
Implicit in the Court's new test was a recognition of the increased complexity
of federal legislation and of the need to curb the increased volume of federal
litigation.24
The Court made the first significant amendment to the standard Cort test
in 1979 in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.2 In Touche Ross, the Court

22. Id. at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). One of the cases cited in Cort was
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975). Barbourwas decided prior
to, but during the same Term as Cort. Barbour held that the Securities Investor Protection Act
(SIPA), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78eee, did not contain an implied private right of action.
The Court premised this holding on the theory that SIPA specifically provides for one form of
enforcement and there was no evidence of congressional will to also provide for a private right.
The analysis used by the Court in Barbour was substantially the same as that implemented in
Cort.
23. The Court reasoned that: (1) Congress did not enact the statute for the benefit of a
corporation's stockholders, but to protect the general public from political corruption, Cort, 422
U.S. at 81-82; (2) the Congressional record does not support a theory that Congress intended to
invest the shareholders with a private right of action for the violation of this statute, id. at 82;
(3) the remedy sought would not further the goal of the statute, i.e., such an inference would
be inconsistent with the legislative scheme, id. at 84; and (4) state corporate law was the traditional
recourse for such acts, id. at 84. After Cort was decided, 18 U.S.C. § 610 was repealed in 1976.
See Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 496 (1976).
24. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377.
25. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). Defrauded investors sought to impose liability upon an auditor of
a defunct brokerage, which the SEC found in violation of section 17(a) of the 1934 Act, by
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denied a private right of action under the financial auditor provisions of the
1934 Securities and Exchange Act. In so doing, it shifted the weight of the
Cort test onto the statutory scheme and legislative intent elements. The Court
pointed out that each of the four parts of the Cort test did not deserve equal
weight. The central question was whether Congress intended there to be a
private right of action under the statute. The Court concluded that there is
no evidence that the statute by its terms grants a private right to any identifiable
class and the legislative history is silent on the issue. As the majority opinion
states: "At least in such a case as this, the inquiry ends there . . .
In 1980, the Court decided Middlesex County Sewage Authority v. National
Sea ClammersAssociation.27 The Middlesex decision, more than others before
it, evinced the Court's conviction to look primarily to the perceived intent of
the legislature in order to determine whether a private right lies ufnder the

reason of an allegedly improper audit and certification of the brokerage's financial statements.
Subsequent to Cort and prior to Touche Ross, the Court heard three private right of action
cases: Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 (plaintiff sued the University of Chicago, claiming it had denied
her admission to its medical school on the basis of her sex, and the Court held that Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 implies a private right of action for those discriminated
against in violation of Title IX); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (minority
shareholder cannot bring Rule lOb-5 action against majority shareholders and the company for
breach of fiduciary duty because Congress intended Rule lOb-5 to reach only manipulative or
deceptive conduct); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (tender offeror, suing in his
capacity as a takeover bidder, does not have a private right of action under section 14(e) of the
1934 Act).
26. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 576.
Current Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote this opinion, perhaps indicating the direction the present
Court would take on the section 17(a) private right question.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also filed a concurring opinion in California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287 (1981), in which he opined that the majority had placed too much emphasis on Cort in light
of the subsequent implied rights cases which limit it. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring) (discussing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)).
See also Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560; Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
27. 453 U.S. 1 (1980).
Between its decisions in Touche Ross and Middlesex, the Court heard several private right
cases. During the next term the Court had occasion to limit even further the Cort analysis in the
case of Transamerica, 444 U.S. 11 (shareholder of a real estate investment trust filed shareholder
derivative suits for violation of sections 206 and 215 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-1 to 80b-19 (1983)). The Court re-emphasized that congressional intent is the primary factor
to consider in determining whether to infer a private remedy or not-previous decisions to the
contrary notwithstanding. Relying on what it perceived to be the intent of Congress, the Court
never reached the third or fourth Cort factors.
In Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981), the Court held that the DavisBacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1983), does not confer a private right of action upon an employee
under a contract which is by its terms not subject to that Act.
In Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, the Court held that the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act
of 1899, codified as 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1983), does not afford a private right of action to citizens
allegedly injured by a claimed violation of section 10 of that Act.
The Court recently reaffirmed Cort, with an emphasis on the second and third factors, in
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). In Russell, the Court held
there is no private right of action under section 409(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1983).
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statute in question. "The key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature." s2
The issue in Middlesex was whether fishermen had a cause of action for
damages to their fishing grounds, caused by ocean dumping of sewage, under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 29 or the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act of 1972.30 The Court looked to the express enforcement
provisions of the acts to conclude that Congress knew how to create such
rights when it so desiredY The Court thus decided that legislative history did
not support an interpretation that Congress had desired to provide private
rights in addition to the express remedies it supplied in those acts.
In 1982, the Court added a new dimension to the implied private right
question. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc. v. Curran,32 the Court
addressed the issue of how much weight courts should lend to the inference
that Congress tacitly approves established judicial interpretation of a statute
when it subsequently amends a body of legislation.3 3 Justice Stevens, who
wrote for the majority, concluded that the key to the case was the understanding of the intent of Congress in 1974, the time when it comprehensively
reexamined and strengthened the federal regulation of futures trading.Y Stevens
pointed out that the Court was not faced with a Cort inquiry because Congress
intended to preserve a preexisting remedy when it reenacted the Commodities
3
Exchange Act (CEA) in 1974. 1
At the time Congress reexamined the CEA in 1974, the federal courts had
already "routinely and consistently ' 3 6 recognized a private right of action
under it. The Court held that in the absence of any dispute about the existence
of an implied right of action under the CEA prior to the decision in Cort in
1975, an implied cause of action was clearly a part of the "contemporary
legal context" in which Congress legislated in 1974. 37 Moreover, the Court
stated that its review of the legislative history presented a compelling record
that Congress intended to preserve the preexisting private remedy. In view of

28. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 13.
29. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1983).
30. Id. §§ 1401-1445.
31. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 14 (citing Transamerica,444 U.S. at 19).
32. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). The private right question at issue was whether a party could maintain
an action for damages caused by a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1-32 (1983 & 1987).
The Court also dealt, in dictum, with a separation of powers argument. It held that there
was no merit to the argument that judicial recognition of an implied private remedy violates the
separation of powers doctrine. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 375-76.
33. In 1974, Congress reviewed and amended the Commodity Exchange Act, leaving intact the
sections of the Act which do not expressly provide for a private right of action, but under which
several courts had implied private rights. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 365.
34. Id. at 378. See also infra text accompanying note 102.
35. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 391.
36. Id. at 379.
37. Id. at 381.
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the conclusive evidence of legislative intent, the Court declined to consider
the other factors usually associated with the Cort test.3 8

2.

Contemporary Private Right Analysis

The fundamental question the Court will consider in Cort-type inquiries is
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action. 9 In order to
establish intent, the present Supreme Court will first look to the language of
the statute to see whether it evinces a will by Congress to provide a private
right. The line of decisions since Touche Ross4O has effectively pared the
traditional four-part Cort test to the second and third questions. Congressional
intent and statutory consistency constitute the "essential predicate for implication of a private remedy. ' 4 1 The requirements are strict. As a result, the

38. Id. at 387 n.86. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, filed a
strongly-worded dissent. He deplored the Court's deviation from the standard set forth in Transamerica-that is, the Court looked to congressional inaction, rather than positive congressional
approval of such an implied right. He emphasized that only a dozen lower courts had wrongly
found an implied right under the statute and that Congress' inaction in 1974 with respect to the
CEA was not "affirmative intent" of Congress to approve a private right of action under the
CEA.
39. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560. The question for the Court to consider is "not one of whether
this Court thinks it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Id.
at 578.
40. The table below is a breakdown of the private right of action cases showing whether the
justice voted for or against the implication of a private right. Italics denotes that the particular
justice wrote the opinion, a concurrence, or a dissent. A subscripted number 1 denotes a concurring
opinion. Transamericadealt with two private right issues. In the chart below, Transamerica-A
refers to section 215, while Transamerica-B refers to section 206.
An "X" denotes that the justice did not participate in the decision. Justice Scalia did not
participate in any of the listed decisions.

1

Case
Cort
Piper
Santa Fe
Cannon
Touche Ross
Transamerica-A
Transamerica-B
Universities
Sierra Club
Middlesex
Merrill Lynch'
Russell

Ail

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes ,No,
No
No
X
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No , No
No

0 c

c~0

.

,

No
Yes
No,
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No

~

to

IR
.~

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
No
No

No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No ,

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No,

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No,

No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
X
No

No
No
No
Yes,
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No

41. Russell, 473 U.S. at 145 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451
U.S. 77, 94 (1981)).
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Court "will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that
Congress did not intend to provide," 42 even if the plaintiff can satisfy the
first part of the Cort test.
If the language of the specific statute is inconclusive, one must look at it
in the context of the surrounding sections. The Court considers persuasive the
existence of provisions within the same act which expressly provide for private
remedies as evidence of a desire by Congress not to provide for private remedies
elsewhere. The Court will also pay special attention to the legislative record.
Given the existence of a usable record, the analysis is similar to the analysis
of statutory language. One must query whether there is evidence of a congressional. will to allow private suits under the statute in question. In the
absence of explicit evidence of congressional intent, the language of the statute
controls.
Only if the language and the history are both ambiguous would one proceed
43
to analyze the statute under the first and fourth criteria set forth in Cort.
These two criteria, however, are probably only of academic value given the
Court's strong predisposition toward the explicit congressional intent element
of the analysis. If the language of the statute does not reasonably imply the
existence of a private right of action, the Court is unlikely to find that one
exists.
Under the first Cort factor, the statute must explicitly confer by its language
a right directly on a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member.
Stated another way, the especial benefit spoken of in the first Cort factor
refers not simply to the party benefiting from the statute, but whether Congress
intended to confer federal rights upon that party. If the statute constitutes
merely a general ban which carries with it no implication of intent to confer
rights on a particular class of persons, the Court is unlikely to infer a private
remedy. Finally, subsequent legislative treatment of the statute at issue-for
example, amendment-may give rise to an inference, in the presence of established judicial authority, that Congress tacitly approved of the courts'
4
interpretation of the statute in question. A
C.

The Courts of Appeals

The circuits are split on the issue of whether a private right of action exists
under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 4 although the trend is clearly toward
42.
43.
44.
45.

Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 297.
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. See supra text accompanying note 22.
See Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. 353.
One court noted that:
the reason for the somewhat awkward development of the law under section 17(a)
...is the fact that it has traditionally lived in the shadow of... Rule lOb-5. Rule
lOb-5 ...is substantially identical to section 17(a). When the judiciary recognized

a private cause of action under Rule lob-5 ...cases that might have fit a section
17(a) cause of action were instead developed under Rule l0b-5.
Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted).
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denying a private right. Two circuits have squarely held in favor of a private
right of action under section 17(a),4 three circuits have held no private right
exists, 47 and the remaining seven have not addressed the issue or their position
remains unclear s Many of the precedents in this area were established prior
to the Cort decision and its progeny. Consequently, some of the circuits may
49
reverse'their decisions in the near future.
Those circuits which have clearly held in favor of a private right of action
under section 17(a) are the Second 50 and Fourth5l Circuits. The Second Circuit
has, however, called into question the soundness of its decision in Kirshner
v. United States 2 in light of subsequent Supreme Court authority.53 The Fourth
4
Circuit decision in Newman v. Prior,1
like most of its kindred, simply glossed
over the issue. Although this case is frequently cited to support the existence
of a private right of action under section 17(a), it contains almost no discussion
55
of the issue, and cites as authority a case equally lacking in analysis.
56
57
5
The Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have clearly rejected the proposition of an implied private right under section 17(a). The Fifth Circuit

46. See infra notes 50-51.
47. See infra notes 56-58.
48. See infra notes 62-68.
49. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged that its holding in Kirshner
v. United States, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979), may be open
to re-examination in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Yoder v. Orthomolecular
Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 559 n.3 (2d Cir. 1985).
50. Kirshner, 603 F,2d 234.
51. Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975).
52. 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978).
53. See supra note 49. Moreover, the Kirshner court, as have several others, relied heavily
on the language of Judge Friendly's concurring opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 976 (1971). Judge
Friendly noted, "[o]nce it has been established ... that an aggrieved buyer has a private action
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, there seems little practical point in denying the existence of an
action under § 17-with the important proviso that fraud, as distinct from mere negligence, must
be alleged." Id. at 867 (Friendly, J., concurring).
First, the Kirshner court overlooked the important proviso in Judge Friendly's statement
regarding the allegation of negligence. Second, the Second Circuit decided Kirshner several years
before the Supreme Court established the scienter standard in Hochfelder. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text. If one applies Aaron, 446 U.S. 680, in the civil context and then assumes
that scienter would apply only to section 17(a)(1), while a negligence standard would apply to
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3), the use in Kirshner of Judge Friendly's statement would be erroneous.
54. 518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975).
55. The case cited in Newman is Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974). See also Landry, 688 F.2d at 385 n.13 (discussing the
Newman court's failure to discuss the private right of action issue).
56. Landry, 688 F.2d 381.
57. Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986); Shull v. Dain,

Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). Shull
reaffirmed Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967), with little discussion.
The court in Greater Iowa concluded that Congress intended a private right of action only for
purchasers under section 12(2). 378 F.2d at 790.
58. In re Washington Public Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987)
(en banc).
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opinion in Landry v. All American Assurance Co.s9 was the first appellate
court decision to carefully implement the most recent Supreme Court precedent

in this area. The Landry court discussed at length the history of the section
17(a) private right question and carefully analyzed all four of the Cort factors

before concluding that Congress did not intend a private right of action under
section 17(a).60 The recent Ninth Circuit opinion is equally well-reasoned. 61
The bulk of the circuits either have not yet addressed the issue or
have not made clear their positions, leaving some doubt as to where
64
each individual circuit stands. The First, 62 Third, 63 Sixth,

59. 688 F.2d 381.
60. Landry held that section 17(a) on its face did not satisfy the first factor of the Cort test
because the statutory language does not suggest a private cause of action. It concluded that the
statute merely represented a general censure of fraudulent practices. 688 F.2d at 389. This is
probably the weakest part of the Landry opinion. It stated in a conclusory fashion a proposition
which is open to reasonable disagreement. The first Cort factor asks whether the statute protects
a special class or proscribes certain conduct as unlawful. Section 17(a) is clearly designed to
protect "purchasers" who might bring suit under it if a private cause of action is allowed and
it prohibits as unlawful the conduct described in subsection 1-3. Note, Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933: Implication of a Private Right of Action, supra note 6, at 257-58. See
also Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 6, at 121 (stating that "[s]ection 17(a) clearly makes certain
conduct unlawful. Thus, the first part of the modified Cort-Redington threshold test is met").
The second Cori factor addressed by the Landry court deals with congressional intent. As to
this the court concluded that there was no explicit or implicit legislative intent to create such a
private remedy. It noted the express provisions for civil liability in sections 11 and 12 of the 1933
Act as evidence of a Congressional intent to not allow a private right under section 17(a). It
further cited evidence from the congressional record that spoke against the implication of a private
right of action. Landry, 688 F.2d at 389-90. See also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
Although Touche Ross would have allowed the court to stop its analysis at this point, 442
U.S. at 575-76, the Landry court went on to the third and fourth factors in the test. As to the
third, whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply a
private right, the court concluded it is not, owing to the presence of sections 11 and 12, which
already expressly provide for such a remedy. "Section 17(a)(2) prohibits the same type of conduct
as §§ 11 and 12, but has none of the limitations imposed by Congress. The creation of an implied
cause of action § 17(a) [sic] under these circumstances would effectively frustrate the carefully
laid framework of the Act." Landry, 688 F.2d at 390.
As to the fourth Cori factor, the court concluded that section 17(a) is not a cause of action
traditionally relegated to state courts. Id. at 390-91.
61. Washington Public Power, 823 F.2d 1349.
62. See Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 779-80 (Ist Cir. 1983) (court acknowledged
split in authority and declined to rule because the section 17(a) claim was defective for other
reasons); Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Mass. 1982) (no ruling from the First Circuit
on the issue). Cf. Massara v. Vernitron Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Mass. 1983) (no private
right of action under section 17(a)).
63. See Schultz v. Cally, 528 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1975) (reserves ruling). But see Ohio v.
Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 689 n.1 (10th Cir. 1981) ("considerable
doubt" exists as to whether there is a private right under section 17(a)), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
895 (1981); Binkley v. Sheaffer, 609 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (no private right of action
under section 17(a)); Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Del. 1981) (in a thorough analysis of
the issue, carefully tracing the evolution of Supreme Court treatment of implied private rights,
the court held no private right to exist under section 17(a)).
64. See Jones v. First Equity Corp. of Fla., 607 F. Supp. 350 (D.C. Tenn. 1985) (concluded
no private right after applying the Cort test); Basile v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
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Tenth, 6 Eleventh,6 and D.C. 67 Circuits have not ruled on the question.
6
The position of the Seventh Circuit likewise is uncertain.

II.

LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF THE 1933 SECURTIES ACT

Cort v. Ash 69 and its progeny hold legislative intent to be the touchstone
of a Section 17(a) private right of action inquiry. 70 Before turning to a dis-

cussion of the utility of the relevant legislative history, it is beneficial to
examine the history of the 1933 Act in general and section 17(a) of the Act
in particular.

A.

What the 1933 Act Does and Does Not Say

The 1933 Act "was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of

material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce,
to protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified

'7
civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealings." 1
Congress, working feverishly to enact emergency legislation in the heat of the

depression, devoted little time to debate of the 1933 Securities Act. 72 On March

551 F. Supp. 580, 585 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (no private right; relies on legislative history; notes lack
of thorough analysis by courts finding private right). But see State of Ohio v. Crofters, 525 F.
Supp. 1133, 1140 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (adopted Kirshner without independent analysis).
65. Compare Masri v. Wakefield, 602 F. Supp. 404 (D.C. Colo. 1983) and Freeman v.
McCormack, 490 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (no private right of action) with Geller v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (private right exists under section
17(a)).
66. See Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 739 n.2 (lth Cir. 1982) (question of a private right
of action reserved); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Haydu, 675 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.1
(11th Cir. 1982) (Eleventh Circuit does not disagree with the holding that there is no private right
of action under section 17(a)). But see Akers v. Bonifasi, 629 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Tenn. 1984);
Zelman v. Cook, 616 F. Supp. 1121 (D.C. Fla. 1985) (no private right of action under section
17(a)).
67. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 350
n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (D.C. Circuit expressly declines to decide issue of private right), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 955 (1981). But see Hammerman v. Peacock, 607 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1985)
(no private right of action).
68. Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979) (private right
exists); Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). But see Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762
F.2d 522, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1985) (private right of action under section 17(a) still open question
in Seventh Circuit); Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F. Supp. 1547 (D.C. III. 1985) (citing
Landry, 688 F.2d 381, in holding that no private right exists under section 17(a)).
69. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., Ist Sess. 1-5 (1933)).
72. The figures were staggering. In the decade following the First World War approximately
$50 billion worth of new securities were floated in the United States, fully half of which proved
worthless. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933).
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29, 1933, barely three weeks after his inauguration, President Roosevelt delivered a message to the Senate in which he implored Congress to take broad
steps to protect the investor in America from unscrupulous sellers. 73 Congress
responded with several bills. 74 The House allowed only five hours for debate
and no amendments by the time the final bill reached the House on May 5,
1933.71 The bill passed without roll call the same day. The Senate took no
more time and passed its version of the bill with practically no discussion.
Both houses passed the final bill without discussion or a roll call: the House
on May 22, 1933 and the Senate on May 23, 1933. President Roosevelt signed
the bill into law on May 27, 1933, barely two months after its introduction
76
into Congress.

The two bills of interest with respect to the section 17(a) private right
question were House Report 5480 and Senate bill 875. 77 Both bills went through
two or three drafts before they were submitted to their respective houses for
approval. The two bills differed from one another substantially in approach,
although each had the same basic goal.78 The House and Senate ironed out
the differences, and the final product more closely resembled the House's
9

7
version of the bill.

73. 4 B. ScHwARTZ, THE ECONOMIc REGULATION OF Busmss AND INDUSTRY 2573-74 (1973).
74. The House introduced House Reports 4314, 4500, and 5480. The Senate introduced Senate
bills 875 and 882. See I J. EU.ENBERGER, LEGSLA'nv HIsTORY OF SEcuRITIES ACT OF 1933 AND
SEcuRrTm ACT OF 1934 xvii-xviii (1973). This three-volume series on the 1933 Act is probably
the most comprehensive collection of the legislative record of the 1933 Act available.
75. B. ScHwAIrz, supra note 73, at 2549. The debate and amendment-attaching ability was
restricted because of the "complexities [of the bill] and the danger that an unstudied amendment,
apparently fair on its face, might unbalance the careful articulation of its various sections."
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 29, 41
(1959). James Landis, who was instrumental in the drafting of the House bill, see infra note 91,
presented an informative narrative of the development of the 1933 Act in this Article.
76. For a chronology of the events from the introduction of the bill up through its enactment
into law, see J. ELLENBERGER, supra note 74, and B. SciWARTz, supra note 73, at 2549-50.
77. Other bills were introduced contemporaneously with House Report 5480 and Senate bill
875. House Report 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), was substantially similar to Senate bill 875
and was apparently subsumed to House Report 5480. House Report 4500, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 27
(1933), dealt with the founding of the Securities Division in the Department of Commerce. Senate
bill 882, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 151 (1933), introduced legislation to deal with foreign commercial
transactions.
78. Section 9 of Senate bill 875 was the most notable difference between the House and Senate
bills with respect to this discussion. Section 9 provided for a much broader damage award and
longer limitations period. Whereas the corresponding sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide only
for recision and a two-year statute of limitations, respectively, section 9 of Senate bill 875 would
have allowed a defrauded purchaser to sue for damages in addition to the purchase price any
time within 5 years of the purchase. See H.R. 5480, as passed with Senate amendments, May
10, 1933.
79. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (Conference Report to accompany H.R. 5480, May 20, 1933). This report details in somewhat sketchy fashion the compromises
between the Senate and House bills. For an insider's account of discussions in the Conference
Committee, see Landis, supra note 75, at 43-48.
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The debate in the House was very general in nature, with the bulk of the
discussion centering around the purpose of the Act and what Congress hoped

to achieve with it. Representatives devoted much of the allotted five hours to
depicting the evil practices of the past which needed correction.: They spent

very little time discussing the merits of individual sections of the Act. Consequently, one does not find any substantive discussion of section 17(a) in the
8
House debate. '
What one does find, however, is a significant amount of discussion regarding

the civil liability provisions of the Act, especially as they apply to directorsY2
The Committee hearings also reflected this concern.83 The record reveals that
there was some concern that the courts would hold directors civilly liable for

misstatements or material omissions from prospectuses in cases in which they
had in good faith relied on information which accountants and other subordinates provided them. 4
One can surmise from this record that, to the extent it had a unified "intent"
with respect to what was to become section 17(a), Congress specifically envisioned separate and distinct civil and criminal liability sections. Although

this is evident in the language of the Act, 85 the legislative record corroborates
a desire by Congress to provide only for civil liability in specific, limited
contexts. The legislative history reasonably leads to the inference that Congress-or at least the drafters of the Act-did not intend for civil liability to

80. See 77 CONG. Rac. 2910-55 (1933).

81. For a discussion of House Report 5480, May 5, 1933, see 77 CONG. REc. 2910-55 (1933).
82. See, e.g., 77 CONG. REc. 2913 (statement of Rep. Mapes); id. at 2921 (statement of Rep.
Parker).
83. See, e.g., Federal Securities Act, Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 31, Apr. 1, 4, 5, 1933, at
15, 18, 52, 65-66 (statement of Hon. Huston Thompson, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.);
id. at 124-25 (statement of Ollie M. Butler, Foreign Service Division, Department of Commerce).
Under the section of the House Committee Report entitled "Civil Liabilities," H.R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933), the report stated: "Sections 11 and 12 create and define
the civil liabilities imposed by the act and the machinery for their enforcement which renders
them practically valuable." Id. at 9. The report also stated: "To impose a greater responsibility
[than those provided by sections 11 and 121 ... would unnecessarily restrain the conscientious
administration of honest business with no compensating advantage to the public." Id. at 10. See
also id. at 21-24.
84. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1933). The drafters of the 1933 Act
assuaged this fear by placing strict limitations on the civil liability provisions of the Act.
A law journal comment in 1934 regarding the 1934 amendments to the 1933 Act stated: "No
part of the original Act caused more comment or justifiable criticism than those sections providing
civil liabilities. It is not surprising, therefore, to find some modifications of these sections."
Comment, Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933, 32 MIcH. L. Rav. 1130, 1134 (1934).
85. Justice Frankfurter said, "[W]hen the legislative history is doubtful, go to the statute."
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956). In the present case, the 1933 Act specifically
provided for limited civil liabilities in sections 11 (Civil Liabilities on Account of False Registration
Statement) and 12 (Civil Liabilities Arising in Connection with Prospectuses and Communications),
with a strict limitations period defined in section 13 (Limitation of Actions). See infra notes 125,
131.
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lie under any provision within the Act, apart from the express civil liability
sections. A corollary of this proposition is that Congress did not intend to
provide a private right of action under section 17(a), the criminal provision.
One must, however, exercise caution against reading "intent" into legislative
voids.8 The best answer to this enigma is probably that, in their haste to
enact the new legislation, most members of Congress never considered the
issue of a private right of action under section 17(a)Y
Interestingly enough, the most explicit evidence of intent given by any
member of Congress with respect to civil liability under section 17(a) of the
1933 Act, came in debate regarding the 1934 Act. Senator Fletcher, who
sought to amend section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, stated in a memorandum: "It
is to be noted that enforcement of the provisions of the new subsection is
left to injunction, stop order, and criminal prosecution. No civil liability
attaches for any violation thereof." 8 One commentator has noted that Senator
Fletcher was commonly associated with the 1934 Act and that he was probably
well acquainted with the 1933 Act as well. 9
B.

What the Commentators Said

Several commentators wrote on the 1933 Securities Act around the time of
its enactment. Some, such as SEC Commissioner Douglas 9° and Federal Trade
Commissioner Landis, 9' were well positioned to best know Congress' .intent
with respect to section 17 of the new securities act-to the extent Congress
had a unified "intent." Douglas stated in the section of his Article on criminal
penalties under the new Act: "No penalties are stated nor any civil rights
expressly given. Section 17 does not enlarge civil remedies of purchasers. This
seems clear by implication, since Sections 11 and 12 expressly state the remedies
which are available."
In a 1933 address to the New York Accountants,
Commissioner Landis stated:

86. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
87. See Note, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933: Implication of a Private Right of
Action, supra note 6, at 260 n.112 (The five hour debate and no amendment constraint may have
precluded any discussion of a private right under section 17(a).). There is, however, evidence that
the drafters of the House bill did consider the section 17(a) private right issue. See supra notes
82, 84 and accompanying text.
88. 78 CONG. REc. 8711-12 (1934).
89. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: JudicialRevision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw.
U. L. Rnv. 627, 656-57 (1963) ("It seems clear that in Senator Fletcher's opinion no civil liability
attached under Section 17 of the 1933 Act.").
90. William 0. Douglas left his post as the first Commissioner of the SEC to become a
Justice on the United States Supreme Court.
91. James Landis was a professor at Harvard Law School at the inception of the development
of the 1933 Act. After the completion of his work on the bill, he left his teaching post at Harvard
to work for the Federal Trade Commission. See Landis, supra note 75.
92. Douglas & Bates, supra note 5, at 181-82. In an omitted footnote to this quote, the
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The suggestion has been made on occasion that civil liabilities arise also
from a violation of Section 17, the first subsection of which makes unlawful
the circulation of falsehoods and untruths in connection with the sale of
a security in interstate commerce or through the mails. But a reading of
this section in light of the entire Act leaves no doubt but that violations
of its provisions give rise only to a liability to be restrained by injunctive
action or, if willfully done, to a liability to be punished criminally. 93

James Landis, in his 1959 Article on the legislative history of the 1933
Act,"' recounted that the authors of the Conference Report 95 deliberately
included language regarding some of the more controversial provisions of the
bill in the hope that courts and administrative bodies would construe it to be
the "intent" of Congress. The authors hoped the language chosen would
control judicial and administrative interpretation of the Act. 96 There was
especial concern regarding the civil liabilities of directors. Landis considered
it a victory to have won out in the Conference Committee over the Senate
civil liabilities provision, which effectively would have made all directors
insurers of the accuracy of their statements contained in registration statements
required by the Act. To not have adopted the House version, with its limited
civil liability provisions, would have "imposed an unjust and unsurmountable
burden" on directors. 9 Imposing civil liability under section 17(a) now might
result in exactly the type of liability the Committee agreed to avoid.

C.

Subsequent Amendments

The question is whether the case law in favor of, or contrary to, finding
an implied right under section 17(a) was sufficiently well established at the
time of the subsequent amendments to the 1933 Act for a court today to
infer that Congress tacitly approved of the judiciary's position on the private
right question. The Supreme Court stated in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran:

authors queried whether the making of an act unlawful under section 17(a) gives to purchasers
an action of rescission on the grounds of illegality.
The Supreme Court apparently rejected the doctrine of ex pressia unius in this context.
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 295 n.6 (1981); Cort, 422 U.S. at 82 n.14 (1975); SEC
v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1934). The creation of one explicit mode of
enforcement is not dispositive of congressional intent with respect to other complementary remedies.
The Court has, however, in later decisions taken such provisions into account. See, e.g., Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
93. Landis, Liability Sections of Securities Act Authoritatively Discussed, 18 Am. AccT. 330,
331 (1933). A further review of the literature of the time by this writer yielded either no mention
of civil liability under section 17(a) or opinions concurring that none existed. No comments were
unearthed in that body of literature opining that a private cause of action exists under section
17(a).
94. Landis, supra note 75.
95. H. R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
96. Landis, supra note 75, at 47.
97. Id. at 48.
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In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a federal

statutory scheme when the statute by its terms is silent on that issue, the
initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the legislation

was enacted. More precisely, we must examine Congress' perception of
the law that it was shaping or reshaping. When Congress enacts new
legislation, the question is whether Congress intended to create a private
remedy as a supplement to the express enforcement provisions of the
statute. When Congress acts in a statutory context in which an implied
private remedy has already been recognized by the courts, however, the
inquiry logically is different. Congress need not have intended to create a
new remedy, since one already existed; the question is whether Congress
intended to preserve the pre-existing remedy.Y

Congress amended different sections of the 1933 Act in 1934, 1954, and
again in 1975. Although Congress concentrated its work in 1934 on the express
civil liability sections of the 1933 Act,9 no body of case law regarding section
17(a) had yet been developed to enable one to infer a tacit approval of any
private right of action. In 1954, Congress amended section 17(a) to add the
words "offeror" before the word "sale," but otherwise gave no hint of
providing for a private right or condoning a judicially implied one. 100 By 1954,
only one circuit-had addressed the issue in any form.'0 ' In 1975, Congress
again amended the Act with minor changes, but left section 17(a) intact and
there is no indication in the legislative record that Congress even considered
the section 17(a) private right issue.e 2
The Ninth Circuit' 3 recently addressed this issue and concluded that one
could not reasonably infer that Congress tacitly condoned a private right of

98. 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982) (footnote omitted). See also supra text accompanying note 30.
99. See 78 CONG. REc. 8711-12 (1934).
100. The House Committee Report states under the section entitled "Liabilities Attaching to
Registration and Investor Protection," that "It]he law ...prohibit[s] false and misleading statements under penalty of fine or imprisonment, or both. In addition, if an investor suffers a loss
in the purchase of a registered security, the law does provide him with important recovery rights.
Section 11 of the act provides [for damages]." H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2973, 2978.
The report also states:
[Sections 9, 10, and 11] of the bill add the word "offer" to sections 12, 17, and
22 of the Securities Act in order to make clear that the civil and penal liabilities
and sanctions imposed by the statute shall remain unchanged, notwithstanding the
changes made elsewhere in the statute. Section 12 of the present statute provides
that a purchaser of a security may recover from the seller .... Section 17 is the
general fraud provision under which criminal and injunctive actions are brought
Id. at 2999.
101. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n.2 (2d Cir. 1951) (action by stockholders against company for fraudulent statements in prospectus; the court noted in a footnote
that plaintiff could plead a section 17(a) cause with a section 11 cause of action so long as the
section 17(a) claim added adequate allegations of fraud).
102. See 121 CoNo. REC. 10,711-10,759, 11,740-11,786 (1975). The courts were also split at that
time and no overwhelming consensus existed as to the § 17(a) issue. In re Washington Public
Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
103. Washington PublicPower, 823 F.2d 1349.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:623

action when it amended the securities laws in 1975. Plaintiffs had argued that,
although the decisions in the district courts were not unanimous, all the circuits
which had reviewed the issue at the time had ruled irn favor of an implied
right. The court nevertheless concluded that no overwhelming consensus ever
existed in section 17(a) precedent, and it could not reasonably determine
whether or not Congress approved of a section 17(a) private right when it
amended the laws in 1975.104
Until the Hochfelder decision in 1976, the courts ignored section 17(a)
causes of action for the most part. 05 The Court in Merrill Lynch stated that
Congress is presumed to know the law. 106 However, even if one assumes that
the courts substantially agreed on this issue in 1975, it is unlikely that Congress
would have had much notice. Rule lOb-5 actions completely dominated securities fraud cases at this time"07 and the section 17(a) question was not
considered very important. The Court today would probably not accept an
argument based on subsequent legislative amendments absent evidence from
the legislative record that Congress considered the question.
D.

Reliance on the Legislative Record

In determining implied private rights cases, the Supreme Court has placed
heavy emphasis on the "intent" of Congress as evinced by the language of
the statute and the legislative record. In the case of section 17(a), the statute
is silent and the legislative history is nearly silent on the issue. Numerous
courts and commentators have warned that one must tread cautiously in the
murky waters of congressional silence. 08 It is nevertheless worth highlighting
some of the significant shortcomings of reliance on the legislative record of
the 1933 Act in light of the criticisms leveled at such reliance.
1.

Interpreting the Statutory Language

The first Cort factor, for example, dictates that a court inquire into whether
the statute protects a special class of persons, or, in the alternative, whether
it proscribes certain conduct as unlawful. Section 17(a) complies with both of

104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 1357.
See supra text accompanying note 14.
Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 379.
See supra note 13.

108. See, e.g., United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953); Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Helvering v. Halock,
309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940); Bishin, The Law Finders:An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S.
CAL. L. Ray. 1 (1965); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAv. L. Rnv. 863, 873-74 (1930);
Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sound of Congressionaland Constitutional
Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
Chancellor Bismarck may have said it first and best when he purportedly stated, "One should
.not inquire closely how legislation and sausages are made."
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these criteria, 109 but, as Justice Frankfurter warned in Helvering v. Hallock,10
the Court "walk[s] on quicksand when [it tries] to find in the absence of...
legislation a controlling legal principle." If one is to infer a private remedy
under section 17(a), one must essentially look to clues in the language of the
1933 Act in order to do so. By inferring meaning from such statutory hints,
however, one obviously risks reading into section 17(a) a meaning which
Congress never intended. In the alternative, one might ignore a purpose of
the statute which Congress intended, yet failed to articulate in its rush to
enact the 1933 Act. Both results would clearly contravene the avowed intention
of the Court to abide by the original "intent" of the legislature enacting the
statute. Also, as Professor Tribe has warned, by placing too much emphasis
on the intent of Congress, the Court is not treating "the words of [the] statute
as 'the best evidence of what Congress wanted,' " but rather is "making what
Congress wanted the very object of our search rather than merely the frame
for our understanding of what Congress said." '
2.

Interpreting the Legislative History

Relying on the legislative record leads to numerous pitfalls. It is very difficult
to speak of congressional "intent" as if Congress possessed a unified intent.
Congress is comprised of two houses, ruled by two parties, which are made
up of a myriad of individuals. One Senator might vote to approve a bill for
reasons entirely different from those of another Senator. Also, when the
legislative history is very sparse, one must be wary of reading too much into
it. The gaps in the record render reliance on the balance of the evidence
questionable. Similarly, statements by individual members of Congress do not
necessarily reflect anything more than that particular person's opinion, rather
than the will of Congress. One can draw inferences from such statements in
the record, but only at a significant danger of inferring the wrong intent of
Congress as a whole. The briefer the record, the greater is the danger of
reaching the "wrong" conclusion.
In the present case, as discussed above, Congress spent very little time
preparing and deliberating over the original 1933 Act, let alone section 17(a).112
One finds no mention of the private right issue under section 17(a). The
substantial difference between the House and Senate bills speaks against the
inference of a unitary congressional intent. Moreover, a review of the con-

109. Section 17(a) expressly includes bond purchasers in the class of persons it protects. But
see Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982). See also supra note 60.
110. 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940). Accord Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571. (Justice Rehnquist warned
that implying a private right of action in the face of "congressional silence is a hazardous
enterprise, at best.").
111. Tribe, supra note 108, at 523 (emphasis in original).
112. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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gressional record reasonably leads one to conclude that Congress, for the most
part, probably never considered the private right issue. The bill, although a
well thought-out piece of legal drafting under the circumstances, was hastily
drawn and revolutionary in its terms. House debate centered generally on the
need for and applicability of the bill rather than on any specific provisions
within it.
The appropriate question in this case is not whether Congress wanted a
private right of action under section 17(a), but rather, whether Congress had
a desire at all. It appears from the record that Congress never really considered
the issue in 1933. To interpret the intent of Congress with respect to a private
right under section 17(a) runs the risk of finding the opposite of what Congress
intended, or would have intended had it thought about the private right
question when it enacted the 1933 Act. If the Supreme Court applies the
standard private right of action analysis to this case, it must do so with the
understanding that the test might not yield the result Congress would have
wanted. A more honest approach to this particular problem would be to either
admit that Congress never considered the option of an implied private right
of action and to leave that decision to the present day Congress, or to make
the same admission and then attempt to fashion a judicial result based on
the policies underlying the 1933 Act.

III.

HARMONIZING AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT WITH SECTION 17(a)
AN RuLE lOb-5 PRECEDENT

In the case of section 17(a), the issue of whether a private right of action
3
exists is more complicated than an application of the four-part Cort v. Ash"
test. In addition to the problems involved in surmounting the ambiguities of
the legislative record, the Supreme Court must deal with recent section 17(a)
and Rule lOb-5 precedent that would conflict with a finding of an implied
private right of action under section 17(a).
In Aaron v. SEC,"4 the Supreme Court dealt with the standard of proof
required under section 17(a) in the criminal context. The Court concluded
that the government must establish scienter under section 17(a)(1) in order to
convict, but only negligence under section 17(a)(2) or section 17(a)(3). It
reached this conclusion after examining the language of the statute and the
pertinent legislative history."5 It is questionable, however, whether the Court

113. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
114. 446 U.S. 680 (1980). See also supra text accompanying note 16.
115. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695-96. The Court stated:
The language of § 17(a) strongly suggests that Congress contemplated a scienter
requirement under § 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3). The language
of § 17(a)(1), which makes it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud," plainly evinces an intent on the part of Congress to proscribe only
knowing or intentional misconduct.
Id. The Court relied primarily on the language of the statute because the legislative record lacks
useful discussion of the standard of proof under section 17(a). Id. at 695-698.

1988]

IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION

will adhere to this scienter-negligence standard if it chooses to infer a private
right of action under section 17(a). 116
The Supreme Court adopted the scienter standard for Rule 10b-5 actions
in Ernsf & Ernst v. Hochfelder,17 basing its decision primarily on the language
of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The SEC borrowed the language of Rule
10b-5 from section 17(a).111 Even though Rule lOb-5 and section 17(a) do not
share a common genesis, it would be anomalous to require the scienter standard
in one civil action and not the other. Moreover, to infer a negligence standard
under section 17(a) in the civil context would effectively subvert the Hochfelder
decision.119 Plaintiffs who could not prove scienter in order to sue under Rule
lOb-5 could simply file under section 17(a)(2),or section 17(a)(3). Finally, the
legislative record militates against the conclusion that a negligence standard
would apply in the civil context under section 17(a).120
2
In the same year as Aaron, the Court decided United States v. Naftalin,1'
a criminal case in which it held that to prove a violation of section 17(a)(1),
the SEC need only prove that there was a fraud in connection with a "sale."
More importantly, the victim need not be an investor. 122 The Court further
held that section 17(a) was an exception to the general policy of the 1933 Act,

116. There are significant differences between SEC enforcement actions and private damages
actions that make it unnecessary in an injunctive action "to establish all the elements required
in a suit for monetary damages." SEC v. Capital Gains Research, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963);
Kramas v. Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1982) (SEC injunction actions
are inapposite because they "involve interests and procedures different from those involved in
private damage suits"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1035 (1982); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 674
(5th Cir. 1980) (assuming a private right exists under section 17(a), Aaron does not abolish
scienter); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 976
(1971); Dannenberg v. Dorison, 603 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (notwithstanding
Aaron, scienter is required in a private section 17(a) cause of action). But see In re Washington
Public Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the Supreme
Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that scienter is required under
section 10(b) only because Congress so intended and that since Aaron used the same rationale,
the same rule should apply to private actions).
117. 425 U.S. 185. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 12.
119. Cf.Aiken, supra note 6, at 212-13 (doubtful that the Supreme Court would give different
interpretation from Aaron if it found a private cause of action to exist).
120. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Although the Court concluded in Aaron that
the language of section 17(a) was the best indicator of whether scienter or negligence applied, it
did so because of the paucity of a legislative record on the issue. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695-96.
This reasoning may not apply in the present case. There is enough language in the legislative
record for one to infer reasonably that Congress wished to limit the exposure of directors to a
negligence standard. This wish is also reflected in the limited civil liability provisions in sections
11 and 12 and in section 13.
121. 441 U.S. 768 (1979). Defendant was convicted for employing a scheme to defraud brokers
in the sale of securities.
122. Id. at 772. Defendant argued that although he defrauded the brokers who executed the
sales, section 17(a)(1) requires that the victim of the fraud be an investor. The Court disagreed;
the fraud need only occur "in" an offer or sale. Id.
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which was designed to apply solely to the new issue of securities. Under the
Court's holding, section 17(a) covers all fraudulent schemes, regardless of
whether the security is new or old.'2
Nafta/in interpreted section 17(a) rather expansively. That holding might
prove troublesome in the civil context if the Court acknowledges a private
right of action. As with Aaron, the Court will have trouble harmonizing a
private right of action under section 17(a) with this case. If the Court adheres
to its holding in Naftalin in civil actions, it would effectively negate the privity
requirement of section 12(2), the express civil liability provisions of the 1933
Act. 124 Under Naftalin, section 17(a)(1) is not limited to fraud against offerees.
Yet section 12 requires privity. An implication of a private right which incorporated the holding in Naftalin would greatly expand the class of persons
who could bring civil actions based on fraud under the 1933 Act.125
Finally, in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,'21 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an implied cause of action under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act would lie for conduct subject to the express remedy of section
11127 of the 1933 Act. The Court first stated that the 1933 and 1934 Acts
were "interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing
transactions in securities." 12s It next precluded any argument that there was

123. Id. at 777-78.
124. Section 12 provides:
Any person who(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of this title [section 5 of
the Act], or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section
77c of this title [section 3 of the Act], other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
of said section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact 6r
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden
of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing
such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender
of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.

15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
125. See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 178. One thing the legislative record does show is a concern
over capital formation. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. To enlarge the class of
potential plaintiffs might contradict the measures taken by the drafters in response to this concern.
126. 459 U.S. 375 (1983). Purchasers of securities brought an action against most of the
participants in the offering, seeking recovery under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. They alleged
that defendants defrauded them by misrepresentations in a registration statement and prospectus
for the securities they purchased.
127. See infra note 131.
128. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 380 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206).
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no private right of action under Rule 10b-5.1 29 The Court then held that the
express provisions of section 11 of the 1933 Act 30 did not preclude defrauded
purchasers of registered securities from maintaining an action under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act. It reasoned that: (1) exempting fraudulent conduct
from liability under section 10(b) would conflict with the basic purpose of
the 1933 Act: to provide greater protection to purchasers of registered securities; 3 ' (2) in section 16, the savings clause of the 1933 Act, "Congress
rejected the notion that express remedies of the securities laws would preempt all other rights of action;' 32 and (3)the Court has "repeatedly recognized
that securities laws combating fraud should be construed not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."'3
If the Court adheres to the modified Cort test, it will probably not find
an implied private right of action under section 17(a). The language of the
Huddleston opinion, however, is inconsistent with the result apparently mandated by that test?M Rule lOb-5 35 is substantially the same as section 17(a);
they both proscribe substantially the same conduct. If, under the Court's
reasoning, section 10(b) furthers the goals of the 1933 Act-and consequently
section 11 should not preclude a cause of action under section 10(b)-then
the Court should treat section 17(a) the same. Applying this reasoning, section
17(a) of the 1933 Act is the most logical antifraud provision one could employ
to further the goal of the 1933 Act. Moreover, if one interprets section 16
(the savings clause) as the Court did, then the express remedies of sections
11 and 12 should not preclude a private right under section 17(a). That a
private right under section 17(a) might have achieved recognition long ago if
plaintiffs had not relegated section 17(a) to the shadow of section 10(b)
supports this reasoning.3 6 Finally, if the courts are to construe federal securities

statutes "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their]
remedial purposes," then the Court should imply a private right under section

129. "[A] private right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 has been
consistently recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of this implied remedy is simply
beyond peradventure." Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 380 (footnote omitted).
130. Section 11, now embodied in 15 U.S.C. § 77k, is one of the express civil liability sections
of the 1933 Act. It provides for civil liability to defrauded purchasers arising out of materially
misleading statements in a registration statement. For a discussion of section 12, the other express
civil liability section of the 1933 Act, see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
131. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 382-83.
132. Id. at 383.
133. Id. at 386-87 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
134. It is not inconsistent with a denial of a private remedy under section 17(a) of the 1933
Act to hold that section 11 does not preclude a section 10(b) remedy. Section 10(b) offers a
different remedy that is free from any constraints of the express civil remedies section within the
1934 Act one finds in the 1933 Act. Moreover, section 11 and section 10(b) address different
types of wrongdoing.
135. See supra note 12.
136. See supra note 45.
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17(a) in order to best accomplish the purchaser-protection goal of the 1933
Act.
The analysis .the Court employed in Huddleston is inconsistent with the
major emphasis it placed on congressional intent in the line of cases beginning
with Cort v. Ash.' 37 If the Court is willing to hear arguments in favor of an
implied right of action under section 17(a) based on such policy-oriented
arguments as it used in Huddleston, the answer to the private right question
is not nearly as clear as Cort and its progeny would otherwise dictate. Once
one departs from the traditional Cort test, numerous policy considerations
come into play which have little to do with the will of the legislature in 1933
and which might require a very different result.
Nevertheless, despite the myriad of persuasive arguments commentators have
made in favor of an implied private right of action under all or part of section
17(a),'1 8 the Court is unlikely to delve any deeper into the issue than examining
the statutory scheme and the legislative record. The dearth of evidence of a
congressional will to imply such a private right will likely prove fatal to any
arguments proponents of a private right of action might put forth. Also,
problems the Court will encounter reconciling the section 17(a) private right
issue with its section 17(a) and Rule lOb-5 precedents will likely dissuade it
from finding an implied private right of action.
CONCLUSION

Under present Supreme Court precedent, the question of the existence of
an implied private right of action under section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities
Act is primarily one of statutory construction and legislative intent. The
legislative record is, for the most part, silent on the subject, leaving the words
of the statute and the coterminous express civil liability provisions of the 1933

137. See also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Chevron presents another dimension to the Court's emphasis on congressional intent. In Chevron,
the Court considered the question whether the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency was authorized to adopt a regulation permitting an industrial complex to be treated as a
"bubble." The Court concluded that Congress had not directly addressed the precise question at
issue. Id. at 851. Once a reviewing court reaches this conclusion, the Court stated, the question
it has to consider is "not whether in its view the [bubble] concept is 'inappropriate' in the general
context of a program designed to improve air quality, but whether the Administrator's view that
it is appropriate in the context of this particular program is a reasonable one." Id. at 845.
Chevron is not a private right of action case, rather it deals with administrative agency authority.
The rationale the Court employed is nevertheless remarkable given the Court's strong reliance on
the legislative record in the private right of action cases. It seems inconsistent for the Court to
depart from such reliance in cases involving agency discretion. If one applies the logic of Chevron
to the section 17(a) issue, an implied private right of action under section 17(a) is clearly "reasonable" within the context of the 1933 Act. Although the Court is working with a different
entity in agency authority cases, it appears arbitrary for the Court to apply different standards
to two cases in which Congress clearly has not considered the proposed right or action.
138. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6.
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Act to aid the Court in answering the question. The Supreme Court, if faced
with this question, will probably conclude that the express provisions, along
with the circumstantial evidence in, the legislative record and the opinions of
commentators of the time, indicate that Congress did not intend civil liability
to flow from section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. The Court will also
shy away from finding an implied private right of action because of conflicts
with other Supreme Court rulings regarding section 17(a).
The legitimacy of this conclusion, however, is questionable given that Congress probably never considered the question of a private right of action under
section 17(a). It is difficult, if not impossible, to divine an intention from this
legislative silence. Nevertheless, should the Supreme Court go beyond a Corttype analysis to consider the policies which animated enactment of the federal
securities laws, a flexible interpretation of such policies might support the
implication of a private right of action under section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities
Act.
MARK A. RYAN

